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Abstract 
We examine the impact of governance reforms related to board diversity on the performance of 
EU banks. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we document that reforms increase bank 
stock returns up to two years after their introduction. We find that the impact is similar across 
mandatory and affirmative actions, albeit the former increase bank risk. The performance-
diversity relationship varies with the type of reform. While gender diversity per se seems to have 
no significant influence, when women’s presence is mandatory it reduces risk. The effectiveness 
of reforms depends on a country's institutional environment, its legal origin and its cultural 
openness to diversity.  
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“Members of boards of directors did not come from sufficiently diverse backgrounds.”  
 (European Commission, 2010, p. 6) 
 
1 Introduction 
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, policy makers and bank regulators started raising 
questions about the effectiveness of boards of financial institutions, as it became apparent that this key 
decision-making body did not fulfil its key role to exert monitoring over senior management and failed to 
identify, understand, and challenge risk-taking practices. Several shortcomings were identified in post-
crisis analyses, the most common of which concerned the composition of the board of directors. The 
European Commission (2010) noted “a lack of diversity and balance in terms of gender, social, cultural 
and educational background” and called for strong and legally binding action from Member States and 
EU institutions to ensure diversity in boardrooms. Thus, a series of initiatives ensued to promote gender 
equality and diversity on the boards of publicly listed companies, which resulted in changes to national 
corporate governance codes in a number of countries. At the EU level, CRD IV (a 2013 legislative 
package covering prudential rules for banks) includes enhanced corporate governance rules, 
incorporating requirements to promote diversity in board composition.  
Did the corporate governance reforms aiming at increasing diversity of bank boards impact on 
bank performance? This paper addresses this question by employing an identification strategy which 
allows us to study the impact of board reforms using between country variation in the timing and the type 
of reforms pursued as well as the type of diversity supported. 
The prevailing consensus is that more diverse boards would positively affect the corporate 
governance of companies. Diversity has a number of potential benefits: board members can be selected 
from a wider pool of talent, which can offer a broader range of perspectives, access different resources 
and wider connections. Diversity is often seen as key to creativity and innovation (Hillman, 2014). On the 
other hand, diversity can lead to conflict, slow down decision-making, and lead to conflict of interest as 
different board members may be pursuing different agendas (Ferreira, 2011). Gender diversity in 
particular has received a great deal of interest, as a gender gap persists in the financial industry and there 
is growing evidence of a glass ceiling (IMF, 2018). However, whether the gender diversity of the board 
matters for firm performance is more controversial. Pletzer et al. (2015) present a systematic review of 
the literature and conclude that the relationship is consistently small and non-significant. In other words, 
female representation on corporate boards is not associated, positively or negatively, with firm 
performance. This result reinforces the view that women are neither better nor worse than men in 
leadership positions or at managing risks and that promoting less-gender biased hiring may lead to a 
mixed-gender board performing better because of the benefits of a multiplicity of views and skills 
(Nelson, 2014). 
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It is important to point out that, despite the consensus on the need for encouraging diversity, the 
approaches taken at the national level have varied widely, with some countries introducing mandatory 
quotas for gender and employee representatives, others promoting diversity more generally as an 
encouraged best practice. Recent evidence suggests that affirmative actions aimed at improving the 
participation of women and minorities in high profile roles have had little impact. IMF (2018) research 
highlights that, globally, women hold less than 20 per cent of board seats of banks. In addition, sanctions 
for non-compliance with corporate governance rules vary among EU member states. A well-researched 
example is the Norwegian gender quota case requiring all public limited companies to have at least 40 per 
cent of women on their boards of directors. After voluntary compliance failed, the requirement became 
regulation, with liquidation as a penalty for non-compliance. The merit of gender quotas has been 
intensely debated in the literature; a number of recent studies of the Norwegian case find evidence 
suggesting that it led to younger and less experienced boards and deterioration in firms’ operating 
performance (Ahern and Dittmar, 2012; Bøhren and Staubo, 2016; Garcia Lara et al., 2017). Since the 
crisis, a number of European countries, including Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and 
Germany, have promoted legislation aiming to increase gender diversity on corporate boards via the 
imposition of quotas. This drive has been reinforced by the European Commission (2012) proposals to 
achieve a 40 per cent participation rate for the under-represented gender in non-executive board-member 
positions in publicly listed companies by 2020. However, the regulatory framework of EU member states 
is still very fragmented, with some countries, such as the UK, arguing against mandatory quotas.  
In this paper, we evaluate the role of reforms that aim at promoting diversity on bank 
performance. Departing from the current literature which tends to exclude financial firms, we focus on 
the impact of board-related reforms on the performance of EU listed banks. Bank governance is 
considered to be different from that of non-financial firms primarily because of the existence of deposit 
insurance, implicit government guarantees, and prudential regulation (Laeven, 2013). Although there is a 
growing body of literature on the role of board diversity, including gender diversity (Adams and Ferreira, 
2009, Hagendorff and Keasy, 2012; Berger et al., 2014; Garcia-Meca et al., 2015; Sila et al., 2016), to the 
best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to examine the effectiveness of reforms aiming at promoting 
diversity. We start our analysis with a thorough review of all the changes in corporate governance 
relating to board diversity in all EU member states. We analyse a comprehensive set of sources, including 
the industry codes of best practice, corporate governance codes, national legislation as well as EU and 
international organisation reports on corporate governance. We consider all types of board diversity 
reforms, from recommendations to foster best practice to legislative changes imposing mandatory quotas, 
and we code them accordingly.2 This enables us to build a novel dataset of all diversity-related changes 
that have the potential to impact on the composition of listed firms board of directors.  
The heterogeneity across European countries with regard to the timing and the type of these 
reforms facilitates the set-up of a treatment-based empirical approach that overcomes the endogeneity 
                                                   
2 Appendix 1 summarises all our sources and details the reforms that we investigate. 
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issues arising in attempting to explain the impact of board diversity on bank performance. Our analysis 
examines the impact of reforms on several aspects of bank performance including returns, risk, and bank 
charter value. In order to ensure that the reforms are related to the recognition of the role of governance 
and not a response to economic difficulties or firm distress, we scrutinise the trend in bank performance 
in the years preceding the enactment of the reform. We examine various windows surrounding the 
introduction of reforms to assess the timing and duration of their effect. It might be argued that the 
effectiveness of reforms depends on whether they are legally enforceable. We therefore assess the role of 
reform approaches by distinguishing between mandatory reforms - implemented through the imposition 
of quotas on the proportion of minority representatives - and recommendations, implemented through 
affirmative actions. In addition, we examine the effect of components of reforms related to specific board 
diversity characteristics, such as gender and employee representation, on the performance-board diversity 
relationship. Finally, we examine the success of reforms across different country-level conditions such as 
cultural, legal, and institutional background by differentiating between countries culturally more and less 
open to diversity and those with common and civil law legal systems. 
Using a difference-in-difference empirical framework that controls for country and time fixed 
effects and allows for bank-specific residual serial correlation, we find evidence that board diversity 
reforms impact positively on bank performance. The reforms significantly increase stock returns and their 
impact is economically significant. Their effect seems to occur over the first three years from the 
enactment of the reform. Our analysis shows that the approach taken to adopt the reforms matters for 
bank stock return volatility. In particular, the introduction of quotas on women and employees increases 
risk but there is no differential impact on returns. The effectiveness of reforms depends on a country’s 
prior institutional environment. In countries more open to diversity, reforms reduce stock market risk and 
increase bank value. There is variation in the effects of reforms across civil law and common law 
countries. While reforms increase returns in countries of both legal origins, they reduce risk and increase 
value only in countries with a common law system. They are also shown to be more beneficial for banks 
that have ex-ante more heterogeneous boards. Finally, we find that board diversity is a significant 
determinant of bank performance. The relationship between board diversity and performance changes 
following the reforms and varies with the type of reform. We find that the presence of women on bank 
boards per se seems to increase risk; however, the legal enforcement of gender diversity results in women 
having a risk-reducing effect. The presence of employee representatives reduces bank risk, and this effect 
persists post employee-related reforms. Overall, our findings suggest that board diversity reinforcement 
improves average bank performance and strengthens the role of board diversity features. 
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we contribute to the literature on 
exogenous changes in corporate governance by focusing on crisis-induced regulatory changes in the 
banking sector. Government-induced reforms are an important tool for fostering effective board practices 
by requiring or encouraging firms to invest in changes that might be opposed by their controlling 
shareholders. From an empirical viewpoint focusing on a country-level shock to board composition that, 
albeit not necessarily exogenous in terms of timing or origin, is exogenous to the individual banks within 
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a country as its potential influence might not be aligned with shareholders’ intentions, provides an 
identification strategy that mitigates endogeneity concerns present in the examination of the relation 
between board characteristics and firm value. We contribute to this strand of the literature by conducting 
an EU-wide analysis exploiting the cross-country heterogeneity in governance practices and focusing on 
the more heavily regulated banking sector. Our hand-collected sample of bank board data and corporate 
governance reforms across the EU facilitates the analysis of different dimensions of diversity and their 
effects across different institutional backgrounds. The paper closest to ours in this respect is the study by 
Fauver et al. (2017) who present an analysis of the impact of corporate board reforms on firm value 
worldwide. The authors however do not address the issue of diversity and exclude from their analysis 
firms in regulated industries, such as banks. We also complement the growing body of literature on the 
impact of national culture. A growing body research examines how national culture plays a central role in 
a country’s adoption of rules and regulation, suggesting that cultural difference can help explain financial 
behaviours (see among others, Guiso et al., 2008, 2013; Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2011; Ahern et al., 
2015; Eun et al., 2015, Aggarwal et al., 2016).  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 proposes our identification strategy. 
Section 3 discusses the data and the descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents the results. Finally, Section 5 
concludes. 
2 Identification strategy  
2.1 Board diversity reforms 
We begin our analysis by manually collecting information on all corporate governance reforms 
that took place in EU member states between 2007 and 2014. This involved analysing a broad set of 
sources, such as corporate governance codes, national legislation, European and international 
organisation reports on corporate governance. Our primary sources for governance reforms are 
publications from each country’s relevant regulator. Not all reforms have the same impact on firm 
conduct: in some countries, reforms on corporate governance follow the enactment of new legislation and 
are therefore legally binding. In other countries, corporate governance codes establish best practices, but 
are not legally enforceable. We consider all types of reform, from recommendations to foster best 
practice to legislative changes. We complement our initial investigation of each country’s changes to 
corporate governance practices with the analysis of the reports from the European Corporate Governance 
Institute (ECGI), the European Commission (EC), the European Foundation for the Improvement of 
Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound), the European Trade Union Institute, the United Nations 
Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women), and the World Bank Report 
on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC).  
We focus on reforms that promote board diversity, both in general and in respect to specific 
aspects such as gender diversity and employee representation, for two main reasons. First, reforms on 
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board diversity were highly encouraged at the EU level. Secondly, diversity reforms can be uniquely and 
clearly identified among corporate governance reforms introduced in recent years (European Banking 
Authority, 2016).  
We classify the board diversity reforms into: (i) mandatory quotas, if a country’s regulator has 
chosen to impose a diversity quota (often a gender quota promoting the presence of women on boards of 
listed firms), and (ii) affirmative actions, if a country’s regulator has chosen to actively encourage board 
diversity, but not to impose it. We identify the relevant changes in the countries’ corporate governance 
codes and national legislations and the year in which these were implemented. In some countries, changes 
in corporate governance codes promoting diversity pre-date our sample period; in this case, the country is 
classified as “no reform” during the sample period. In case of more than one change, we consider the date 
of the earliest introduction; if a country moves from an affirmative action to a mandatory quota (e.g., 
Italy), both dates are considered as relevant. Further, we specifically investigate whether the reform is 
mandatory or simply encouraged. Similarly, we distinguish between reforms which specifically address 
the presence of women or employees on the board. Table 1 shows the diversity status at the beginning of 
the sample period and the identified reforms, by year and by country.  
< Insert Table 1 about here > 
There is a great heterogeneity in the type of diversity reforms carried out by EU member states in 
the period under analysis. Between 2007 to 2014 we coded board diversity reforms as approved in 14 
countries. Most reforms explicitly encourage diversity, with two countries in our sample, France and 
Italy, imposing a (gender) quota. Seven countries have undergone no board diversity-related changes in 
their national governance codes over the sample period (namely, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Finland, 
Hungary, Romania, Spain, and Sweden). In five countries rules encouraging board diversity or 
prescribing quota were already in place before 2007; only in Romania and Cyprus board diversity was 
not encouraged prior to the financial crisis and no changes were made in its aftermath. 
 
2.2 The difference-in-difference baseline model 
The following difference-in-difference (DID) approach is adopted to test the average effect of 
diversity-related reforms on bank performance:  !"#$ = &' + &)*+,-.+/#$+	1"#$ ∙ 3 + 4"#$ 
(1) 
where !"$ refers to the performance of bank i in country j in year t; 1"#$ is a matrix containing the k bank-
specific control variables; and DREFORMjt is a dummy for the post-reform period in country j which 
takes a value of one when the first diversity reform is introduced and thereafter, and 0 otherwise. The 
noise εijt is assumed independently distributed from the k bank controls. In all regressions, we allow for 
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flexible error correlation structure within banks by clustering standard errors at the bank level. Our 
parameter of interest is &), where a positive estimate indicates an increase in bank performance following 
board reforms.  
Because our setting involves multiple treatment groups and time periods, we control for year 
fixed effects through a full set of time dummies and for unobserved group heterogeneity by including 
country fixed effects.3 Country instead of firm fixed effects are used to control for group effects to avoid 
the issue of unreliable estimates of the coefficients of the bank controls caused by bank fixed effects 
absorbing most of the variation across banks. The country and year fixed effects identify the within-
country and within-year reform-induced change in bank performance between treatment banks (in reform 
countries) and benchmark banks (in countries with no reforms) at a given time. The treatment group 
comprises banks in countries that have undergone changes in their national government codes related to 
board diversity. The control group comprises all firms from countries without reforms as of a particular 
time (Fauver et al., 2017). 
Our DID set-up therefore compares changes in bank performance following the board diversity 
reforms with changes in bank performance of countries without board diversity reforms during the same 
years. With this set-up, we aim to isolate the effect of board diversity reforms from other factors 
potentially affecting bank performance. 
Our main bank performance measure is the bank the stock return (STOCK RETURN), computed 
using annualised average daily stock returns over a year. We also employ the standard deviation of the 
stock return (STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY) as a proxy for performance variability, or risk (see, among 
others, Beltratti and Stulz, 2012). As an additional test, following the extant literature, we use Tobin’s Q 
(TOBIN’S Q) as a proxy for the bank charter value (Adams and Santos, 2006; Fauver et al., 2017). We 
define Tobin’s Q as the ratio of the bank’s market value to its book value, where the bank’s market value 
is defined as the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity and 
use its natural logarithm in the analysis.  
To mitigate the effect of correlated omitted variable bias, we control for a set of bank-level 
characteristics that are typically related to bank performance (Adams and Santos, 2006; Laeven and 
Levine, 2009; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Kanagaretnam et al., 2014; Garcia-Meca et al., 2015). 
Specifically, we include bank size measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. We also control for 
the possible effect of bank growth on performance by including total asset growth. Next, we control for 
asset composition using the loan to asset ratio and for the quality of the loan portfolio using the loan loss 
                                                   
3 In robustness checks, we control for potential omitted variable bias caused by country effects using a set of 
country-specific variables including: (i) the size of the economy, measured by the natural logarithm of gross 
domestic product per capita (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Kanagaretnam et al., 2014); (ii) the concentration of the 
banking system, measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (Laeven and Levine, 2009; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; 
Kanagaretnam et al., 2014); and (iii) a proxy for a country’s financial development, that is, the size of the capital 
markets, measured by the natural logarithm of the country’s market capitalisation. The results are qualitatively 
similar; we, therefore, opt for country fixed effects. 
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provision ratio. We control for funding sources by including the deposit and short-term funding to total 
assets ratio. We account for the impact of capital on bank performance by including the capital to total 
assets ratio. Finally, we control for the bank operating efficiency proxied by the cost to income ratio. The 
definition and construction of the variables used in the study are reported in Appendix 2. Correlations are 
reported in Appendix 3. 
2.3 The difference-in-difference model with time windows 
When evaluating the impact of reforms of bank performance, the timing of their implementation 
is of particular importance. To address the concern of confounding events and other factors potentially 
influencing bank performance that may contaminate the effect of reforms, we introduce in our DID 
framework time windows surrounding the introduction of reforms. It can be argued that the main 
response of banks to changes in governance regulations will take place in the first three years. Hence, we 
split the post-reform dummy into two sub-periods of [0, +2] and [+3, T], where T denotes the end of the 
sample period.  
Additionally, we gauge the exogeneity of the reforms by tracking their effect one year before 
their enactment to ensure that there is no decreasing trend in bank performance in the years leading to the 
reforms [-1, +2]. In doing so, we attempt to rule out the scenario that reforms are a response to economic 
difficulties or banking scandals rather than an outcome of the wider realisation of the importance of 
governance.  
Finally, we introduce in our DID framework reform timing dummy variables that track the effect 
of the reforms exactly before and immediately after they become effective. Specifically, we test whether 
there is a significant change in bank performance in specific years surrounding the reform by replacing 
the post-reform period dummy with the set of dummy variables DREFORMt, t = (-1, 0, +1, +2), which 
equal one for the year before the reform becomes effective, the year in which the reform becomes 
effective, the one and two years after the reform becomes effective, and the post-reform window dummy 
[+3, T], which equals one for the third year and onwards after the reform becomes effective. 
2.4 The reform approach and type of diversity 
We then test whether the effectiveness of reforms depends on the approach taken to adopt the 
reforms, that is, through the imposition of quota or an affirmative action. We do so by augmenting 
Equation (1) with the interaction between the post-reform period dummy and a variable indicating 
whether the reform imposes a quota (DQUOTA). During our sample period we encounter two instances 
were quotas were implemented – in France in 2011 and in Italy in 2012; all other reforms involved 
affirmative actions simply encouraging board diversity. 
In addition, we examine whether the type of diversity promoted matters. Our focus is primarily on 
gender diversity, which is the dominant call in the vast majority of diversity-oriented corporate 
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governance reforms, and secondarily on employee representation. We therefore identify those reforms 
that explicitly target gender balance and encourage employee representation on the board. We then 
perform the test by replacing our post-reform dummy in Equation (1) with a post-gender reform dummy 
variable (DREFORMWOM) and a post-employee reform dummy variable (DREFORMEMPL). The 
impact of reforms may depend on the ex-ante board composition. To this end, we control for banks’ pre-
reform board diversity features by adding BOARDWOM and BOARDEMPL, the proportion of female 
directors and employee representatives on the board, respectively. We then test the incremental impact of 
reforms on the role of board minorities by including the interaction of the post-reform dummy variable 
with the corresponding board diversity characteristic.  
3 Sample and descriptive statistics 
For all the countries in our sample, we collect data on their publicly listed commercial banks. We 
focus on listed banks because of the assumption that these institutions are subject to more stringent 
regulatory controls and compliance requirements; it also enhances cross-country comparability and 
augments data availability in terms of board composition; in addition, publicly listed banks share 
internationally adopted accounting standards; finally, the recent changes to corporate governance 
regulation and codes of conduct affect mostly publicly listed companies. We collect banks’ stock market 
data from Thomson Eikon, balance sheet and income statement data from Orbis Bank Focus (Bureau van 
Dijk and Fitch Ratings), and corporate governance data from BoardEx. We exclude banks with missing 
total assets and those with less than three observations over the sample period. To mitigate the influence 
of outliers, we winsorise bank balance sheet and income statement data at 99 per cent of the bank-year 
distribution. The final sample consists of 84 publicly listed banks (620 bank-year observations) from 21 
EU countries over the period of 2007-2014, which covers 60 per cent of the total assets of these 
countries’ banking systems at the end of the sample period. Details on the sample composition are 
provided in Appendix 4. 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the selected performance measures, board, bank-
specific and country-specific characteristics for the sample. Panel A reports data on the full 2007-2014 
sample period. The sample banks, on average, have a stock return of 6 per cent, with a yearly standard 
deviation of 41 per cent. Boards appear to be male-dominated, with female directors constituting only 13 
per cent of the total board members, while employee representatives, account for only 8 per cent of the 
board. To capture the extent of overall diversity in a bank’s board, we construct a diversity index 
(5.6+**781) that relies on four aspects of diversity - gender diversity, employee representation, 
internationalisation, and age - and ranges from 0 to 1.4 The average value of the index in our sample of 
                                                   
4 We capture the overall level of diversity for each board of directors by a bank-specific board diversity 
index inspired by Li and Wahid (2017). The index relies on four dimensions of diversity, that is, the fraction of 
women on the board, fraction of employees on the board, fraction of foreign members on the board, and coefficient 
of variation of board members' age. These are converted into discrete score variables *"$# = (1,2, … ,10)	based on 
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banks is 0.41 and 54 per cent of the banks exhibit boards that are more diverse than that of the average 
bank.  
Looking at the bank-specific characteristics, the sampled banks are relatively large, with average 
asset value of around 293 billion euro, and asset growth rate of 7 per cent per year. In terms of balance 
sheet structure, 59 per cent of the sampled banks’ assets is invested in loans; their main source of funding 
is deposit and short-term liabilities (67 per cent of total assets), while only around 7 per cent of their total 
assets is funded by equity capital.  
Turning to the country-specific characteristics, mandatory reforms were implemented in 13 per 
cent of the sampled countries; most of the countries adopt a civil law system and have a value of the 
Hofstede index, our proxy for a country’s openness to diversity, below the median.  
Panel B of Table 2 reports the results of the test for differences in the means of performance 
measures between the pre- and post-reform periods. The post-reform average bank returns are 
significantly higher than their pre-reform counterparts, whereas risk is significantly lower.  
< Insert Table 2 about here > 
4 Empirical results 
The main aim of our analysis is to examine the impact of board diversity reforms on bank 
performance. 
4.1 Do board diversity reforms impact bank performance?  
Table 3 reports the estimation results of Equation (1), where performance is measured by the 
annualised average daily stock return and the standard deviation of stock return. The effect of reforms is 
captured by the coefficient of the post-reform period dummy variable. Model (1) is the baseline model, 
which includes the post-reform period dummy, bank-specific controls as well as country and time fixed 
effects. In order to disentangle the influence of reforms from other attributes and events that may affect 
bank performance, we restrict the sample period to the years surrounding the introduction of the reforms. 
Specifically, Model (2) splits the post-reform period dummy into two sub-periods of [0, +2], capturing up 
to two years after the reforms become effective, and [+3, T], where T denotes the end of the sample, 
capturing the subsequent years after the reform becomes effective. Model (3) adds the year preceding the 
                                                                                                                                                                   
their respective decile of the sample distribution. The diversity index for each bank-year is computed as 5.6+**781"$ = )@' ∑ *"$#@#B)  and ranges from 0 (low diversity) to 1 (high diversity). The construction of the index 
meets the four criteria that have been suggested for a good diversity measure: (i) it has a zero point to represent 
complete homogeneity, (ii) it is positively related to diversity, (iii) it does not assume negative values, and (iv) it is 
bounded. In addition, the index is a suitable measure of diversity for categorical variables that are skewed in a 
proportion of one category (that is, gender or employee representation), as mapping onto deciles mitigates the 
impact of large values. 
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reform in the first sub-period of [-1, +2] to incorporate any anticipation effect of reforms on bank 
performance. Model (4) repeats the analysis in Model (3) after introducing reform timing dummy 
variables that track the effect of the reforms exactly before and immediately after they become effective. 
Specifically, we test whether there is a significant change in bank performance in specific years 
surrounding the reform by replacing the post-reform period dummy with the set of dummy variables 
DREFORMt, t = (-1, 0, +1, +2), which equal one for the year before the reform becomes effective, the 
year in which the reform becomes effective, the one and two years after the reform becomes effective, 
and the post-reform window dummy [+3, T],  which equals one for the third year and onwards after the 
reform becomes effective. 
< Insert Table 3 about here > 
We find that the coefficient on DREFORM in Model (1) is positive and statistically significant at 
the 10 per cent level for stock returns suggesting that bank stock returns increase following the board 
diversity reforms. The impact of DREFORM is also economically significant, with the stock returns 
increasing by 20 per cent, on average, following the reforms.  
The results reported in Model (2) confirm the significant increase of bank stock returns following 
the board reforms. The findings further reveal that the response to changes in governance regulation takes 
place in the first three years after they become effective. Specifically, the coefficient on the post-reform 
window dummy DREFORM[0,+2] is positive and significant for stock returns whereas the coefficient on 
DREFORM[+3, T] is insignificant.  
If the reforms were passed in response to deteriorating market conditions or banking scandals, 
one would expect to observe an effect prior to the reforms. The results of Model (3) provide no evidence 
of such an effect with the coefficient on DREFORM[-1,+2] emerging insignificant as opposed to the 
coefficient on DREFORM[0,+2] in Model (2). The results of Model (4) corroborate the absence of any 
effect the year prior to the board reforms. That is, Model (4) for stock returns shows an insignificant 
coefficient on the t = −1 dummy variable and a significantly positive effect on the t = 0 dummy variable. 
The results for the standard deviation of stock returns show positive and significant t = 0 and t = +1 
dummy variables suggesting an increase in risk in the year of the reform and the subsequent year. While 
the insignificant coefficient on the t = −1 dummy variable for both risk and return might be attributed to 
the inclusion of yearly time effects, the findings of Models (3) and (4) overall suggest that the reforms 
largely reflect countries’ recognition of the role of diversity in governance and commitment to increase 
diversity of banks’ boards, rather than a response to their economic difficulties. 
For the control variables, the results show that stock returns are higher among banks with a lower 
asset growth, smaller and better quality loan portfolios, and greater operating efficiency; whereas risk is 
higher among banks that are larger and less capitalised, hold loan portfolios of poorer quality, and operate 
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less efficiently. These findings are generally consistent with prior studies (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; 
Kanagaretnam et al., 2014). 
4.2 Reform approach  
Our results thus far suggest a positive relation between board diversity reforms and bank 
performance. However, regulators may adopt different approaches to implementing reforms: if a country 
has chosen to impose a diversity quota, often a gender quota promoting the presence of women on boards 
of listed firms, the reform is mandatory and forces all banks to act accordingly. However, if a country has 
chosen to actively encourage board diversity through an affirmative action, banks can adapt new rules to 
their existing structure. To detect the role of the approach taken to adopt board diversity reforms on their 
effectiveness, we augment Equation (1) with an interaction term between the post-reform period dummy 
DREFORM and the dummy DQUOTA that takes the value of one when a quota is introduced. The 
estimated coefficient measures the incremental impact of mandatory reforms on bank performance 
relative to affirmative actions. Table 4 presents the results. 
< Insert Table 4 about here > 
The findings of this analysis show that the reform approach adopted has no impact on the effect 
of reforms on bank stock returns as the coefficient on the interaction dummy DREFORM x DQUOTA is 
insignificant. Nonetheless, it does emerge positive and statistically significant for the standard deviation 
of stock return, suggesting that the introduction of quota increases the volatility of stock returns. In other 
words, when regulators do not allow flexibility in introducing reforms, bank risk increases. This finding 
is consistent with Bohren and Staubo (2015), who suggest that forcing radical gender balance on 
corporate boards through the introduction of quota is negatively associated with firm performance as a 
result of a strong upward shift in board independence which is a much more widespread property among 
female directors than among male directors. The authors argue that a firm performs worse the more its 
post-reform board gender mix deviates from its optimal pre-reform level.  
4.3 Reinforcement of specific board diversity characteristics 
Among the various board diversity reforms that have been implemented in the wake of the 
financial crisis, reforms promoting gender diversity and employment representation have been 
predominant. Given the importance of these two specific types of reforms, we investigate their effect on 
the relationship between board diversity and bank performance. We perform this analysis by estimating 
Equation (1), where we replace our post-reform dummy with a post-gender reform dummy variable 
DREFORMWOM and a post-employee reform dummy variable DREFORMEMPL. We control for the 
board diversity features by adding BOARDWOM and BOARDEMPL, the proportion of female directors 
and employee representatives on the board, respectively, in the equation. We test the incremental impact 
of reforms on the role of board minorities by further including the interaction of the post-reform dummy 
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variable with the corresponding board diversity characteristic. We also present an aggregate version of 
the model, which includes the generic diversity reform and the overall diversity index.  
The results of this analysis are reported in Table 5. Model (1) presents the estimated effects of 
reforms on performance broken down by type of reform. The coefficients on the interaction terms show 
the incremental impact of the specific reform on the effect of the relevant board diversity feature. That is, 
DREFORMWOM x BOARDWOM measures the incremental performance impact of women on the board 
in the period following gender diversity reforms. Likewise, DREFORMEMPL x BOARDEMPL measures 
the incremental impact of employees on the board in the period following employee representation 
reforms. Model (2) is the aggregate model with the bank diversity index and the post-reform interaction 
term DREFORM x BOARDDIVX. The coefficient on the interaction term shows the incremental impact 
of aggregate board diversity in the post-reform period.  
< Insert Table 5 about here > 
Model (1) shows that gender- and employee-related reforms only affect bank risk. Looking at 
gender diversity, we find positive coefficients on BOARDWOM and DREFORMWOM and a negative 
coefficient on their interaction term for the standard deviation of stock returns. These findings suggest 
that while the presence of women on board and gender reforms per se increase bank risk, their 
enforcement is beneficial, that is, greater gender diversity of boards leads to lower risk when it is legally 
imposed by corporate governance codes. This result is in line with recent IMF (2018) research, which 
finds that, all else being equal, banks with higher female representation on their board have, on average, a 
greater distance-to-default. In other words, it appears that women could have a more stabilising effect if 
there are proportionally more of them among board members. Turning to employee representation, we 
find that the coefficient on BOARDEMPL is significantly negative for the standard deviation of stock 
return, whereas the coefficients on DREFORMEMPL and the interaction term are insignificant. This 
suggests that presence of employee representatives on board reduces bank risk, and this risk-reducing 
effect is not influenced by the introduction of employee-related reforms.  
Model (2) corroborates the beneficial role of board diversity on bank performance, as the board 
diversity index emerges significant for stock return. It further confirms the significance of reforms for 
bank stock returns, however the estimated negative coefficient on the interaction dummy suggests that the 
influence of board diversity decreases following reforms albeit still positive and significant overall.  
4.4 Additional analyses 
4.4.1 National culture 
We next examine whether the effectiveness of board diversity reforms is driven by national 
culture. In so doing, we build upon a stream of the literature that focuses on the links between national 
culture and financial decision-making (Kanagaretnam et al., 2011; Kanagaretnam et al., 2014). 
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In particular, we look at whether reforms are more successful in countries with cultural 
backgrounds that are more welcoming to diversity. Differences in cultural origins define national 
attitudes towards diversity in general and may be able to explain part of the heterogeneity in the 
effectiveness of board diversity reforms. We capture a country’s openness to diversity using the six 
cultural dimensions proposed by Hofstede (1983) - power distance, individualism, masculinity, 
uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientation, and indulgence - and viewed as good indicators of the 
extent to which a society supports diversity (Newbury and Yakova, 2006; Chakrabarty, 2009).5 Using 
data from Hofstede et al. (2010), we derive an overall index as the average of the six Hofstede 
dimensions and form a Hofstede dummy variable, which takes the value of one if the value of the 
Hofstede index is above the sample mean (higher national openness to diversity) and zero otherwise 
(lower national openness to diversity).6  
To conduct the test, we augment Equation (1) with an interaction term between the post-reform 
dummy DREFORM and the Hofstede dummy DHOF that takes the value of one for countries more open 
to diversity. The results are reported in Panel A of Table 6. 
We find that national culture has no impact on the effect of board diversity reforms on banks’ 
stock returns. However, the significance of the interaction indicator variable for the standard deviation of 
stock returns suggests a positive incremental effect of reforms in countries more open to diversity, that is, 
in these countries, reforms decrease bank risk. Countries’ cultural traits are of fundamental importance 
for the quality of formal institutions and for the effective implementation of reforms, even in societies as 
highly developed as the EU member states (Gutmann and Voigt, 2018). Cultural traits enhancing 
equality, independence from political influence or individual status have also been proved to be 
conducive to economic growth (Voigt et al., 2015). This finding suggests that a country’s openness to 
diversity strengthens the effect of board diversity reforms on bank performance and is, therefore, an 
important factor to be considered when assessing the impact of reforms (Frijins et al., 2016).  
< Insert Table 6 about here > 
4.4.2 Legal framework 
To further analyse the impact of country-level conditions on the effectiveness of board diversity 
reforms, we examine the legal origin. An extensive literature starting with La Porta et al. (1997) supports 
the view that the legal framework adopted by a country is an important factor in explaining investor 
                                                   
5 For instance, a society that welcomes individualism, long-term orientation, and indulgence in the form of 
deviations from strict social norms is associated with a greater support of diversity. In contrast, a society where 
masculinity, power concentration, and uncertainty avoidance prevail is considered to be less open to diversity. 
6 The values of our Hofstede index range from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating countries more open to 
diversity. For power distance, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance, greater openness to diversity is indicated by 
lower values; hence we use (100 – Dimension’s value) when constructing the Hofstede index. While our index 
represents a snapshot of a country’s cultural openness to diversity at a particular point in time (that is, at the 
beginning of our sample period) and cultural aspects change over time, attitudes and beliefs transform over 
generations and therefore the overall change in national culture is slow. 
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protection and capital market development. La Porta et al. (1998) find that civil laws give investors 
weaker legal rights than common laws, supporting the idea that legal systems matter for corporate 
governance and that firms have to adapt to the limitations of the legal systems that they operate in. More 
recently, Koirala et al. (2018) find that in countries with a weaker market mechanism of corporate 
governance (such as civil law countries), corporate governance reforms substitute the weaker market 
forces of corporate scrutiny and stimulate value-enhancing risk-taking behaviour.  
To examine the impact of board diversity reforms across different legal origins, we augment 
Equation (1) with an interaction term between the post-reform dummy DREFORM and the dummy 
DCOM that indicates the country’s legal framework by taking the value of one for common law countries 
(Kanagaretnam et al., 2014; Fauver at al., 2017). Table 6, Panel B presents the results. 
We find that the impact of reforms on banks’ stock returns is similar in civil and common law 
countries as the coefficient on interaction term DREFORM x DCOM is insignificant. However, it the 
coefficient for the standard deviation of stock return is negative and statistically significant, thus 
suggesting that reforms decrease risk in common law counties in contrast to the risk-increasing effect 
they have in civil law countries (positive and statistically significant coefficient on DREFORM). These 
findings are generally consistent with prior literature and may reflect the greater uncertainty around the 
implementation of reforms and the relative poorer quality of investor protection institutions in civil law 
countries which prevent firms in those countries from accruing the full benefits of the reforms (Fauver et 
al., 2017; Koirala et al., 2018). 
4.4.3 Bank board diversity 
The effectiveness of board diversity reforms may also be influenced by the ex-ante composition of 
the bank’s board of directors, as more heterogeneous boards are likely to be more welcoming to reforms. 
Indeed, diversity brings a variety of experiences and different sets of information to the boardroom 
(Jensen, 1993; Anderson et al., 2011).  
The overall level of diversity for each board of directors is captured by the bank-specific board 
diversity index (5.6+**781). We define banks as having higher board heterogeneity (diversity) if their 
board diversity index exceeds the sample mean and create a board diversity indicator variable DDIV that 
takes the value of one for banks with more diverse boards. We then augment Equation (1) with 
DREFORM x DDIV, an interaction term between the post-reform dummy DREFORM and the board 
diversity dummy DDIV, to test whether the impact of board reforms is different for banks with more 
heterogeneous boards. The results are reported in Table 7. 
< Insert Table 7 about here > 
We find that the impact of reforms on performance is similar across banks with different degree 
of board diversity, as suggested by the insignificant coefficient on the interaction term DREFORM x 
DDIV.  
16 
 
4.4.4 Alternative dependent variable 
To further examine the impact of board diversity reforms on bank performance, we supplement 
our analysis by examining the impact of reforms on bank value. If reforms are beneficial for bank 
performance, we expect them to be positively associated with bank charter value. We capture bank 
charter value using a proxy for Tobin’s Q (Adams and Santos, 2006; Fauver et al., 2017). We define 
Tobin’s Q (TOBIN’S Q) as the ratio of the bank’s market value to its book value, where the bank’s 
market value is defined as the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value 
of equity and use its natural logarithm as our dependent variable. We then repeat the analysis in Tables 4, 
6, and 7 by replacing the dependent variable with Tobin’s Q. The results are reported in Table 8. 
  < Insert Table 8 about here > 
We find a positive incremental effect of reforms in countries more open to diversity as suggested 
by the significant coefficient on the interaction term DREFORM x DHOF in Model (3); that is, in these 
countries reforms increase bank value. We also find that while reforms appear to have no impact in 
countries adopting a civil law framework they significantly enhance bank value in countries with a 
common law system as suggested by the significant coefficient on the interaction term DREFORM x 
DCOM in Model (4). Finally, we find that reforms have a greater impact on banks with more diverse 
boards as suggested by the significance of the interaction term DREFORM x DDIV in Model (5). This 
finding is consistent with Ahern and Dittmar (2012) and Matsa and Miller (2013). As far as bank charter 
value is concerned, the more diverse range of knowledge and perspective in the boardroom offered by 
cultural diversity outweigh, on average, the negative aspects.  
5 Conclusion 
We examine the performance impact of board diversity reforms for EU banks in the wake of the 
global financial crisis. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we document that reforms increase 
bank stock returns, and that this effect materialises in the first three years after the reforms become 
effective. The performance impact of reforms is similar across diversity quotas and affirmative actions, 
albeit the former increase bank risk. Further analysis shows that the performance-diversity relationship 
may vary with the type of reform. While gender diversity per se seems to have a risk-increasing effect, 
greater presence of female directors on board reduces bank risk when it is legally reinforced. We also 
find that the effectiveness of reforms depends on a country's prior institutional environment and, in 
particular, its cultural openness to diversity and legal origin. Finally, the reforms appear to have stronger 
valuation impact for banks that ex-ante have more diverse boards. Our analysis has important 
implications for the banking sector in the light of on-going reforms of corporate governance codes.  
  
17 
 
Table 1 Board diversity reforms  
  
 
2007 diversity status 
(1) 
Changes 2007-2014 
(2) 
2014 diversity status 
(3)   
First board diversity 
reform 
Introduction of 
mandatory quotas 
 
Austria 0 2009  1 
Belgium 0 2009  1 
Cyprus 0 
 
 0 
Czech Republic 1 
 
 1 
Denmark 0 2008   1 
Finland 1 
 
 1 
France 1 2008 2011 2 
Germany 0 2009  1 
Greece 0 2011  1 
Hungary 2   2 
Ireland 0 2013  1 
Italy 0 2011 2012 2 
Lithuania 0 2010  1 
Malta 0 2014  1 
Netherlands 0 2008  1 
Poland 0 2010  1 
Portugal 0 2012  1 
Romania 0 
 
 0 
Spain 2   2 
Sweden 2   2 
United Kingdom 0 2010  1 
The table presents board diversity reforms by country. Column (1) reports the diversity status in 2007; Column (2) 
reports the year in which the reform becomes effective; and Column (3) reports the diversity status in 2014. The 
diversity status can take a value of 0 when board diversity is not addressed in the national corporate governance code 
and/or in national legislation, 1 when board diversity is encouraged in the national corporate governance code and/or in 
national legislation and 2 when board diversity is mandatory (e.g., a diversity quota) in the national corporate 
governance code and/or in national legislation. 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics  
Panel A: Sample summary statistics (2007-2014)   
No. of 
Obs. 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Performance measures 
     
STOCK RETURN 636 0.06 0.77 -2.00 9.44 
STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY 636 0.41 0.25 0.01 3.20 
TOBIN’S Q 635 0.42 1.05 -0.14 7.48       
Board characteristics 
     
BOARDWOM 566 0.13 0.11 0.00 0.60 
BOARDEMPL 566 0.08 0.13 0.00 0.60 
BOARDDIVX 645 0.41 0.22 0 0.88 
DDIV 645 0.54 0.50 0 1 
      
Bank-specific characteristics 
     
TOTAL ASSET 645 292.88 510.64 0.21 2586.70 
ASSET GROWTH 641 0.07 0.16 -0.24 0.81 
LOAN / ASSET 645 0.59 0.19 0.07 0.85 
DEPOSIT / ASSET 645 0.67 0.15 0.25 0.92 
EQUITY / ASSET 645 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.16 
LOAN LOSS PROVISION / LOANS 632 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.06 
COST / INCOME 642 0.61 0.17 0.34 1.50 
      
Country-specific characteristics      
DQUOTA 645 0.13 0.34 0 1 
DCOM 645 0.15 0.36 0 1 
DHOF 629 0.44 0.50 0 1 
    
Panel B: Pre- and post-reform performance 
 
 
Pre-reform Post-reform Difference in means 
  No. of 
Obs. 
Mean No. of 
Obs. 
Mean 
 
STOCK RETURN 330 -0.09 306 0.22 0.30*** 
STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY 330 0.42 306 0.39 -0.02* 
The table reports descriptive statistics for variables used in the analysis. Panel A reports the statistics for 
the full sample period 2007-2014 (number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum and 
maximum values). Panel B reports statistics (number of observations, mean, and mean differential) for 
performance measures of banks before and after the reforms, with the test for the equality of means 
reported in the last column. Definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix 2. 
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Table 3 The impact of board diversity reforms on bank performance 
 STOCK RETURN STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY 
  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
DREFORM 0.2062*    0.0322    
 (1.93)    (1.23)    
DREFORM[0;+2]  0.2096*    0.0330   
  (1.98)    (1.26)   
DREFORM[+3;T]  -0.0521 -0.1420 -0.1707  -0.0277 -0.0021 0.0022 
  (-0.40) (-1.12) (-1.11)  (-0.65) (-0.05) (0.04) 
DREFORM[-1;+2]   0.1072    0.0534  
   (1.13)    (1.59)  
DREFORM-1    -0.0252    0.0507 
    (-0.34)    (1.57) 
DREFORM0    0.2618*    0.0717* 
    (1.71)    (1.81) 
DREFORM+1    0.1796    0.0728* 
    (1.27)    (1.84) 
DREFORM+2    -0.0069    0.0460 
    (-0.07)    (0.90) 
SIZE -0.0353 -0.0360 -0.0372 -0.0329 0.0255*** 0.0253*** 0.0251*** 0.0237*** 
 (-1.11) (-1.13) (-1.14) (-1.00) (3.43) (3.45) (3.44) (3.22) 
ASSET GROWTH -0.2659* -0.2712* -0.2637* -0.2533* 0.0079 0.0067 0.0117 0.0056 
 (-1.87) (-1.84) (-1.82) (-1.77) (0.14) (0.12) (0.21) (0.10) 
LOAN / ASSET -0.2367** -0.2184* -0.2147* -0.2128* -0.0876 -0.0834 -0.0848 -0.0829 
 (-2.07) (-1.80) (-1.78) (-1.72) (-1.57) (-1.55) (-1.58) (-1.58) 
DEPOSIT / ASSET -0.3380 -0.3709 -0.3855 -0.3776 0.1051 0.0975 0.0848 0.0761 
 (-1.23) (-1.30) (-1.30) (-1.25) (1.23) (1.20) (1.03) (0.94) 
EQUITY / ASSET -0.4157 -0.3732 -0.5196 -0.2149 -0.7761** -0.7662* -0.7492* -0.7996** 
 (-0.26) (-0.24) (-0.33) (-0.13) (-2.01) (-1.99) (-1.92) (-2.02) 
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LOAN LOSS 
PROVISION / LOANS  -9.7520*** -10.7524*** -10.9069*** -10.8979*** 6.4751*** 6.2432*** 6.2400*** 6.3516*** 
 (-3.23) (-3.51) (-3.60) (-3.65) (5.48) (5.10) (5.03) (5.09) 
COST / INCOME -0.6033*** -0.6254*** -0.6820*** -0.6517*** 0.2457*** 0.2406*** 0.2241*** 0.2154*** 
 (-3.10) (-3.09) (-3.38) (-3.04) (3.83) (3.82) (3.52) (3.47) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 620 620 620 620 620 620 620 620 
Adjusted R-squared 0.317 0.324 0.319 0.328 0.508 0.512 0.514 0.516 
The table reports the results of the effects of board diversity reforms on bank performance proxied by two measures related to stock returns (STOCK RETURN) and risk (STOCK 
RETURN VOLATILITY). Model (1) presents the baseline results for the effects of board diversity reforms; Model (2) splits the post-reform period into the post-reform windows 
[0,+2] and [+3,T], where T denotes the end of the sample period; Model (3) considers the reform windows [-1,+2] and [+3,T]; Model (4) considers separately the effect of the 
reforms in the years around their introduction (-1, 0, +1, +2). Bank-specific characteristics are winsorised at 99% of the bank-year distribution. The t-statistics are calculated using 
standard errors clustered at the bank level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Definitions of the variables are 
provided in Appendix 2. 
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Table 4 The effect of reform approach: Quota vs. affirmative action 
  STOCK RETURN STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY 
DREFORM 0.2092* 0.0171 
 (1.88) (0.60) 
DREFORM x DQUOTA -0.0110 0.0558* 
 (-0.11) (1.81) 
SIZE -0.0352 0.0252*** 
 (-1.11) (3.42) 
ASSET GROWTH -0.2662* 0.0091 
 (-1.88) (0.16) 
LOAN / ASSET  -0.2375** -0.0833 
 (-2.07) (-1.49) 
DEPOSIT / ASSET -0.3361 0.0954 
 (-1.21) (1.10) 
EQUITY / ASSET -0.4302 -0.7031* 
 (-0.27) (-1.81) 
LOAN LOSS PROVISION / LOANS  -9.7156*** 6.2910*** 
 (-3.21) (5.24) 
COST / INCOME -0.6064*** 0.2616*** 
 (-3.04) (4.03) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes 
Clustered SE (bank) Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 620 620 
Adjusted R-squared 0.316 0.509 
The table reports the results of the impact of the reform approach on the effect of board diversity reforms on bank 
performance proxied by two measures related to stock returns (STOCK RETURN) and risk (STOCK RETURN 
VOLATILITY). The model includes the interaction between the post-diversity reform dummy and the quota dummy, 
DREFORM x DQUOTA, which takes the value of 1 if the reforms are mandatory rather than affirmative actions. 
Bank-specific characteristics are winsorised at 99% of the bank-year distribution. The t-statistics are calculated 
using standard errors clustered at the bank level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix 2. 
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Table 5 The effect of the type of diversity and the diversity-performance relation 
  STOCK RETURN STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY 
 Model Model (1) Model (2) Model (1) Model (2) 
DREFORM  0.3556***  0.0757*** 
  -2.95  -2.26 
DREFORMWOM 0.161  0.0616*  
 -1.25  -1.68  
DREFORMEMPL 0.0722  0.0241  
 -0.3  -0.53  
BOARDDIVX  0.5518***  0.0639 
  -2.86  -1.06 
BOARDWOM -0.2199  0.2218*  
 (-0.58)  -1.82  
BOARDEMPL 1.0867  -0.3248**  
 -1.22  (-2.46)  
DREFORM x BOARDDIVX  -0.3954**  -0.1008 
  (-1.99)  (-1.60) 
DREFORMWOM x BOARDWOM -0.0276  -0.3488*  
 (-0.06)  (-1.87)  
DREFORMEMPL x BOARDEMPL -0.3823  -0.1609  
 (-0.38)  (-0.81)  
TOTAL ASSET  -0.0461 -0.038 0.0269*** 0.0239*** 
 (-1.28) (-1.17) (3.54) -3.1 
ASSET GROWTH -0.2815* -0.2680* 0.0260 0.0006 
 (-1.80) (-1.91) (0.45) -0.01 
LOAN / ASSET  -0.1666 -0.1888 -0.1097* -0.0842 
 (-1.46) (-1.45) (-1.71) (-1.50) 
DEPOSIT / ASSET -0.3290 -0.2689 0.0878 0.0935 
 (-1.14) (-1.08) (1.06) -1.11 
EQUITY / ASSET -0.1182 -0.0226 -1.1183*** -0.8267** 
 (-0.06) (-0.01) (-2.74) (-2.11) 
LOAN LOSS PROVISION / LOANS  -11.2418*** -10.5074*** 6.4531*** 6.4165*** 
 (-3.55) (-3.60) (4.99) -5.44 
COST / INCOME -0.6937*** -0.5624*** 0.2674*** 0.2386*** 
 (-3.52) (-3.13) (3.84) -3.73 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered SE (bank) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 552 552 552 552 
Adjusted R-squared 0.303 0.363 0.512 0.54 
The table reports the results of the effects of different types of board diversity reforms on bank performance 
proxied by two measures related to stock returns (STOCK RETURN), and risk (STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY) 
and of the effect of board diversity characteristics on performance before and after the reforms. Model (1) includes 
a dummy capturing the type of reform (gender or employee), two board diversity features (proportion of women or 
employees on the board) and an interaction term between the reform type dummy (DREFORMWOM or 
DREFORMEMPL) and the relevant diversity variable (BOARDWOM and BOARDEMPL). Model (2) considers the 
effect of the overall level of diversity on the board pre- and post-reforms and includes the post-reform period 
dummy (DREFORM), the board diversity index (BOARDDIVX), and their interaction. Bank-specific 
characteristics are winsorised at 99% of the bank-year distribution. The t-statistics are calculated using standard 
errors clustered at the bank level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. Definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix 2. 
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Table 6 The effect of country-level conditions: National culture and legal framework 
Panel A: National culture: Openness to diversity 
  STOCK RETURN STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY 
DREFORM 0.2479** 0.1059***  
(2.06) (3.64) 
DREFORM x DHOF 0.0016 -0.1664***  
(0.02) (-4.76) 
SIZE -0.0322 0.0222***  
(-1.01) (3.04) 
ASSET GROWTH -0.2028 0.0182  
(-1.56) (0.32) 
LOAN / ASSET  -0.2549** -0.0890*  
(-2.46) (-1.70) 
DEPOSIT / ASSET -0.1861 0.0650  
(-0.78) (0.81) 
EQUITY / ASSET -1.2070 -0.6868*  
(-0.87) (-1.75) 
LOAN LOSS PROVISION / LOANS  -12.0157*** 5.3970***  
(-3.73) (4.44) 
COST / INCOME -0.5184*** 0.2464***  
(-2.76) (3.97) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes 
Clustered SE (bank) Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 604 604 
Adjusted R-squared 0.334 0.526 
 
Panel B: Legal framework: Common law vs. civil law 
 STOCK RETURN STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY 
DREFORM 0.2002* 0.0586**  
(1.80) (2.36) 
DREFORM x DCOM 0.0381 -0.1673***  
(0.25) (-3.36) 
SIZE -0.0350 0.0241***  
(-1.10) (3.31) 
ASSET GROWTH -0.2667* 0.0111  
(-1.88) (0.19) 
LOAN / ASSET  -0.2372** -0.0855  
(-2.07) (-1.54) 
DEPOSIT / ASSET -0.3369 0.1003  
(-1.22) (1.20) 
EQUITY / ASSET -0.4344 -0.6941*  
(-0.27) (-1.84) 
LOAN LOSS PROVISION / LOANS  -9.6478*** 6.0178***  
(-3.19) (5.12) 
COST / INCOME -0.6053*** 0.2544***  
(-3.11) (3.92) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes 
Clustered SE (bank) Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 620 620 
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Adjusted R-squared 0.316 0.518 
The table reports the results of the effect of different country-level institutional characteristics on the impact of board 
diversity reforms on bank performance proxied by two measures related to stock returns (STOCK RETURN) and risk 
(STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY). The model in Panel A includes the interaction between the post-diversity reform 
dummy and the country-specific Hofstede dummy, DREFORM x DHOF, which takes the value of 1 if the sum of the six 
Hofstede dimensions of national culture is above the sample mean (higher national openness to diversity) and zero 
otherwise (lower national openness to diversity). The model in Panel B includes the interaction between the post-diversity 
reform dummy and the legal background dummy, DREFORM x DCOM, which takes the value of 1 for countries which 
adopt a common law framework and zero for countries which adopt a civil law framework. Bank-specific characteristics 
are winsorised at 99% of the bank-year distribution. The t-statistics are calculated using standard errors clustered at the 
bank level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix 2. 
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Table 7 The effect of bank board diversity status 
  STOCK RETURN STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY 
DREFORM 0.1866* 0.0522**  
(1.97) (2.00) 
DREFORM x DDIV 0.0382 -0.0291  
(0.57) (-1.41) 
SIZE -0.0325 0.0248***  
(-1.00) (3.31) 
ASSET GROWTH -0.2511* 0.0025  
(-1.78) (0.04) 
LOAN / ASSET  -0.2386** -0.0893  
(-2.08) (-1.63) 
DEPOSIT / ASSET -0.3081 0.0902  
(-1.15) (1.07) 
EQUITY / ASSET -0.2488 -0.8307**  
(-0.15) (-2.11) 
LOAN LOSS PROVISION / LOANS  -9.8700*** 6.4814***  
(-3.34) (5.45) 
COST / INCOME -0.5886*** 0.2374***  
(-3.11) (3.78) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes 
Clustered SE (bank) Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 620 620 
Adjusted R-squared 0.317 0.511 
The table reports the results of the effect of the current level of bank diversity in the board on the impact of board 
diversity reforms on bank performance proxied by two measures related to stock returns (STOCK RETURN), and risk 
(STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY). The model includes the interaction between the post-diversity reform dummy and 
the bank-specific board diversity dummy (DDIV), which takes the value of 1 if the value of the board diversity index is 
above the sample mean, and zero otherwise. Bank-specific characteristics are winsorised at 99% of the bank-year 
distribution. The t-statistics are calculated using standard errors clustered at the bank level are reported in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Definitions of the variables are provided 
in Appendix 2. 
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Table 8 Alternative dependent variable: Tobin’s Q  
 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
DREFORM 0.0175 0.0112 -0.1645* -0.0895 -0.1389  
(0.20) (0.11) (-1.68) (-1.19) (-1.19) 
DREFORM x DQUOTA 
 
0.0237 
   
  
(0.22) 
   
DREFORM x DHOF 
  
0.4499** 
  
   
(2.45) 
  
DREFORM x DCOM 
   
0.6836** 
 
    
(2.22) 
 
DREFORM x DDIV 
    
0.3111***      
(2.67) 
SIZE -0.0048 -0.0049 0.0084 0.0005 -0.0135  
(-0.11) (-0.11) (0.19) (0.01) (-0.32) 
ASSET GROWTH 0.8335*** 0.8341*** 0.8363*** 0.8194*** 0.8271***  
(3.02) (3.02) (3.06) (3.08) (3.17) 
LOAN / ASSET 0.2019 0.2039 0.2319 0.1946 0.2322  
(0.58) (0.58) (0.66) (0.56) (0.67) 
DEPOSIT / ASSET 0.1018 0.0976 0.2465 0.1184 0.1987  
(0.25) (0.24) (0.59) (0.30) (0.51) 
EQUITY / ASSET 2.2134 2.2445 1.8902 1.8664 2.0897  
(0.78) (0.79) (0.67) (0.69) (0.75) 
LOAN LOSS PROVISION / LOANS 2.5662 2.4890 3.9040 4.4582 3.5004  
(0.50) (0.47) (0.69) (0.93) (0.69) 
COST / INCOME 0.8546 0.8616 0.8508 0.8208 0.8663  
(1.60) (1.63) (1.58) (1.56) (1.61) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered SE (bank) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 620 620 604 620 620 
Adjusted R-squared 0.524 0.523 0.533 0.531 0.531 
The table reports the results of the effects of board diversity reforms on bank performance proxied by a measure 
related to valuation (Tobin’s Q) and various interaction dummies that capture different country- or bank-level 
characteristics. Model (1) presents the baseline results for the effects of board diversity reforms. Model (2) presents 
the results adding DREFORM x DQUOTA, the interaction between the diversity reform dummy and the quota 
dummy, which takes the value of 1 if the reforms are mandatory rather than affirmative actions. Model (3) presents 
the results adding DREFORM x DHOF, the interaction between the diversity reform dummy and the country-
specific Hofstede dummy which takes the value of 1 if the sum of the six Hofstede dimensions of national culture is 
above the sample mean (higher national openness to diversity) and zero otherwise (lower national openness to 
diversity). Model (4) presents the results adding DREFORM x DCOM, the interaction between the diversity reform 
dummy and the legal background dummy, which takes the value of 1 for countries, which adopt a common law 
framework and zero for countries which adopt a civil law framework. Model (5) presents the results adding 
DREFORM x DDIV, the interaction between the general diversity reform dummy and the bank-specific board 
diversity dummy (DDIV), which takes the value of 1 if the value of the board diversity index is above the sample 
mean and zero otherwise. Bank-specific characteristics are winsorised at 99% of the bank-year distribution. The t-
statistics are calculated using standard errors clustered at the bank level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Definitions of the variables are provided in 
Appendix 2. 
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Appendix 1 Reforms promoting diversity in board of directors of listed firms 
Country First board 
diversity reform 
Type of board diversity reform Sources 
  Year Gender Employees Other 
 
Austria 2009 Yes 
 
Yes The Austrian Code of Corporate Governance is based on the provisions of the Austrian 
corporation law, securities law and capital markets law as well as on the principles set out in 
the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. 
Belgium 2009 Yes 
 
Yes The Belgian Code of Corporate Governance is based on the existing Belgian legislation 
applicable to companies, in particular the provisions of the Belgian Code on Companies and 
financial law applicable to listed companies. 
Cyprus 
    
The 2009 Corporate Governance Code issued by the Cyprus Stock Exchange Council is 
enriched by developments both in current Cypriot business practice as well as international 
practice. 
Czech Republic 
    
The 2004 Corporate Governance Code is based on the OECD Principles and it is drawn up by 
the Securities Commission in cooperation with experts of the British Know How Fund. 
Denmark 2008 Yes Yes Yes The Recommendations on Corporate Governance comply with Danish and EU company law, 
OECD's Principles of Corporate Governance and recognised best practice. The 
recommendations are based on, and supplement, company law and stock exchange regulation, 
and such rules and regulations are presumed known. 
Finland 
    
The 2008 Corporate Governance Code, issued by the Board of the Securities Market 
Association, takes into account changes in regulation and international development. 
France 2008 Yes Yes Yes The Recommendations on Corporate Governance, which constitutes the AFEP-MEDEF Code, 
is the reference code pursuant to the Act No. 2008-649 of 3 July 2008 containing various 
provisions adapting company law to Community law and amending Articles L. 225-37 and L. 
225-68 of the French Commercial Code. 
Germany 2009 Yes 
 
Yes The German Corporate Governance Code contains internationally and nationally recognised 
standards for good and responsible governance. 
Greece 2011 Yes 
  
The SEV Corporate Governance Code is based on Law 3873/2010, which incorporates into 
Greek legislation EU Directive 2006/46/EC4. 
Hungary 
    
The 2008 Corporate Governance Recommendations are considered to be an addition to 
relevant Hungarian legislation (predominantly Act IV of 2006 on business associations) and 
are prepared by the Corporate Governance Committee of the Budapest Stock Exchange. 
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Ireland 2013 
  
Yes The Corporate Governance Code for Credit Institutions and Insurance firms became effective. 
Italy 2011 Yes 
 
Yes The Supervisory Provisions Concerning Bank Organisation and Corporate Governance is 
based on the Italian reform of company law and takes into account the most recent 
developments in the legislative framework for corporate organisation and governance, the 
transposition of the new prudential rules for banks, as well as the relevant principles and 
guidelines developed at national and international level. 
Lithuania 2010 
   
The Corporate Governance Code gives specific consideration to similar codes, standards and 
principles adopted by other states and international organisations. 
Malta 2014 Yes 
  
The Corporate Governance Manual for directors of investment companies and collective 
investment schemes became effective. 
Netherlands 2008 Yes 
 
Yes The Dutch corporate governance code is part of a larger system, formed by Dutch and 
European legislation and case law on corporate governance. 
Poland 2010 
   
The Code of Best Practice for WSE Listed Companies draws upon the tradition of Polish 
corporate governance, developed by a range of individuals and institutions in the financial 
market with a significant expert and practical contribution by the Best Practices Committee 
and in the course of discussions with the Institute for Market Economy Research. 
Portugal 2012 
   
The Portuguese Government adopted a Resolution of Council of Ministers to increase, in the 
public and private sectors, the participation of women in the management bodies of the 
companies which complements the Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários Corporate 
Governance Code. 
Romania 
    
The Corporate Governance Code of 2009 contains certain recommendations that are 
supplementary provisions to legal obligation under the laws of Romania (e.g. Companies Act, 
the Accounting Act, the Capital Market Act). 
Spain 
    
The Corporate Governance Code, revised in 2013, is based on the Ley del Mercado de 
Valores, and on the relevant principles and practices at international level. 
Sweden 
    
The Swedish Corporate Governance Code was updated in 2008 and it is based on the Swedish 
Companies Act which came into force on 1 January 2006. 
United Kingdom 2010 Yes 
  
The new version of the UK Code on Corporate Governance became effective. 
Data are from the European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI), the European Commission (EC), the World Bank Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC), 
and publications from each country’s relevant regulator. 
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Appendix 2 Variable definitions  
 
Definition Source 
Performance measures 
STOCK RETURN Daily stock return (annual average)  Datastream (now Thomson Eikon) 
STOCK RETURN 
VOLATILITY 
Standard deviation of STOCK RETURN (t, t-1, t-2) Authors' calculation using Datastream data  
(now Thomson Eikon) 
TOBIN’S Q Tobin’s Q = (Total assets – Equity + Market value of 
equity) / Total assets. In the estimation we use the 
natural logarithm. 
Author’s calculation using Bankscope (now 
Orbis Bank) and Datastream (now Thomson 
Eikon) data 
Board structure variables 
BOARDWOM Fraction of women on the board  Authors' calculation using Boardex data 
BOARDEMPL Fraction of employees on the board Authors' calculation using Boardex data 
BOARDDIVX Board diversity index based on the fraction of women 
on the board, fraction of employees on the board, 
fraction of foreign members on the board and the 
board members’ age variation,  
 Authors' calculation using Boardex data 
DDIV Board diversity dummy assigned the value of 1 if the 
value of the board diversity index is above the sample 
mean (higher bank board diversity) and zero otherwise 
(lower bank board diversity) 
Authors' calculation using Boardex data) 
Bank-specific variables 
TOTAL ASSET Total assets (euro billions) Bankscope (now Orbis Bank) 
SIZE Ln(TOTAL ASSET) Authors' calculation using Bankscope (now 
Orbis Bank) data 
ASSET GROWTH Total asset growth Authors' calculation using Bankscope (now 
Orbis Bank) data 
LOAN / ASSET Loan ratio = Gross loans to total assets Authors' calculation using Bankscope (now 
Orbis Bank )data 
DEPOSIT / ASSET Deposit ratio = Deposit and short-term funding to total 
assets 
Authors' calculation using Bankscope (now 
Orbis Bank) data 
EQUITY / ASSET Equity to total assets Bankscope (now Orbis Bank) 
LOAN LOSS 
PROVISION / LOANS 
Quality of loan portfolio = Loan loss provisions to 
gross loans 
Authors' calculation using Bankscope (now 
Orbis Bank) data 
COST / INCOME Cost to income ratio Bankscope (now Orbis Bank) 
Country-specific variables 
DREFORM Post-diversity reform dummy equal to 1 when the first 
diversity reform is introduced and thereafter, and 0 
otherwise (*) 
Authors' calculation using: European 
Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI), the 
European Commission (EC), the European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living 
and Working Conditions (Eurofound), the 
European Trade Union Institute, the United 
Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the 
Empowerment of Women (UN Women), the 
World Bank Report on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes (ROSC), and 
publications from each country’s relevant 
regulator 
DQUOTA Dummy equal to 1 if country has approved mandatory 
reforms and 0 otherwise 
Authors’ calculation 
DHOF Hofstede dummy = (1) For each country in the sample 
the total value of the six Hofstede dimensions of 
national culture (i.e., (100 - power distance), 
individualism, (100 - masculinity), (100 - uncertainty 
avoidance), long-term orientation, and indulgence) is 
derived; (2) the Hofstede dummy is assigned the value 
of 1 if the derived value is above the sample mean 
(higher national openness to diversity) and zero 
otherwise (lower national openness to diversity) 
Authors' calculation using the Hofstede 
Insight data 
DCOM Dummy equal to 1 if country has a common law legal 
system and 0 otherwise 
Authors' calculation using: CIA; 
Commonwealth network; NYU Law Global; 
Hatzimihail (2013)  
DREFORMWOM Post-women reform dummy equal to 1 when the first 
reform on gender diversity is introduced and 
thereafter, and 0 otherwise 
Authors' calculation 
DREFORMEMPL Post-employee reform dummy equal to 1 when the 
first reform on employee representation is introduced 
and thereafter, and 0 otherwise 
Authors' calculation 
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Reform timing variables   
DREFORM[0; +2] Post-diversity reform window dummy equal to 1 if the 
first diversity reform is introduced in years (t, t-1, t-2) 
and 0 otherwise 
Authors' calculation 
DREFORM[-1; +2] Pre/Post-diversity reform window dummy equal to 1 if 
the first diversity reform is introduced in years (t+1, t, 
t-1, t-2) and 0 otherwise 
Authors' calculation 
DREFORM[+3; T] Post-diversity reform window dummy equal to 1 if the 
first diversity reform is introduced in years (< t+3) and 
0 otherwise 
Authors' calculation 
DREFORMt; Reform timing dummy indicating the year before or 
after the introduction of the reform, where t takes the 
values of (-1, 0, +1, +2) 
Authors' calculation 
The table defines the variables used in the study and the source of the data. (*) first introduction during the sample period (same 
thereafter). 
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Appendix 3 Correlation matrix  
 
TOBIN’S Q STOCK 
RETURN 
STOCK RETURN 
VOLATILITY 
SIZE ASSET 
GROWTH 
LOAN/ASSET DEPOSIT/ASSET EQUITY/ASSET LOAN LOSS 
PROVISION/LOANS 
COST/INCOME BOARDWOM BOARDEMPL 
TOBIN’S Q 1 
           
             
STOCK RETURN -0.052 1 
          
 
0.193 
           
STOCK RETURN 
VOLATILITY 
0.1276* 0.1424* 1 
         
 
0.001 0.000 
          
SIZE 0.0773* -0.010 0.2459* 1 
        
 
0.052 0.804 0.000 
         
ASSET GROWTH 0.1478* -0.0818* -0.1862* -0.2196* 1 
       
 
0.000 0.039 0.000 0.000 
        
LOAN/ASSET 0.030 -0.038 -0.021 -0.2297* -0.029 1 
      
 
0.449 0.339 0.596 0.000 0.463 
       
DEPOSIT/ASSET 0.0664* 0.007 -0.1274* -0.6158* 0.064 0.3610* 1 
     
 
0.094 0.855 0.001 0.000 0.103 0.000 
      
EQUITY/ASSET -0.025 0.046 -0.2535* -0.4732* 0.050 0.2987* 0.4406* 1 
    
 
0.531 0.251 0.000 0.000 0.211 0.000 0.000 
     
LOAN LOSS 
PROVISION/LOANS 
0.1949* -0.016 0.2968* -0.0665* -0.1412* 0.2157* 0.2098* 0.1059* 1 
   
 
0.000 0.692 0.000 0.095 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 
    
COST/INCOME 0.1039* -0.1763* 0.2552* 0.062 -0.1113* -0.2427* -0.1729* -0.2660* 0.037 1 
  
 
0.009 0.000 0.000 0.120 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.353 
   
BOARDWOM -0.045 0.058 0.0781* 0.2730* -0.059 -0.1441* -0.2796* -0.2270* -0.1100* -0.046 1.000 
 
 
0.287 0.165 0.063 0.000 0.162 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.280 
  
BOARDEMPL -0.2466* 0.1064* -0.1788* 0.0742* -0.0826* -0.2193* -0.021 -0.2078* -0.1928* 0.0783* 0.3055* 1 
 
0.000 0.011 0.000 0.078 0.049 0.000 0.622 0.000 0.000 0.064 0.000 
 
The table reports correlations for the regressors used the analysis. * indicates significant at 10 per cent level. Definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix 1. 
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Appendix 4 Sample composition by country in 2014 
 
Country Number of banks Number of bank-year 
observations 
Austria 5 40 
Belgium 3 19 
Cyprus 3 22 
Czech Republic 1 8 
Denmark 5 40 
Finland 2 14 
France 8 64 
Germany 4 32 
Greece 3 21 
Hungary 1 8 
Ireland 2 16 
Italy 13 103 
Lithuania 1 8 
Malta 1 8 
Netherlands 1 8 
Poland 7 54 
Portugal 4 31 
Romania 1 8 
Spain 6 44 
Sweden 5 40 
United Kingdom 8 57 
Total 84 645 
The table shows the number of banks in the sample and the number of bank-year observations 
by country under study. 
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